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ABSTRACT
Bank regulation in Hungary has undergone massive changes in the past 30 
years. It has taken several crises, and the lessons learned from these, for today’s 
far-reaching system of rules governing the smallest details of bank operation 
and risks to emerge. Th is paper sets out to describe the historical frameworks 
for this. In 1989, when the Hungarian Banking Association was founded, bank 
regulation in Hungary was still somewhat basic and rudimentary. Th e 1991 Fi-
nancial Institutions Act brought about substantial changes to this situation. To 
some extent, even at this early stage the Pit. reﬂ ected the globally applied rules 
adopted from the recommendations of the Basel Committee and the European 
Union directives. Eﬀ orts to achieve European legal harmonisation already played 
an increasingly prominent role in domestic bank regulation prior to Hungary’s 
EU accession in 2004. Today, however, the operation of banks is profoundly 
aﬀ ected not only by EU regulations, but by the increasingly rapidly evolving and 
expanding supervisory methodology. Alongside the common EU rules, however, 
there is also scope for rule-making at national level, and Hungary actively makes 
use of this opportunity.
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1 REGULATION OF THE NASCENT DUAL BANKING SYSTEM
At the launch of the two-tier banking system in 1987, the rules on the operation of 
banks only consisted of the most basic requirements. Th e requirements for prudent 
operation were fairly simple: a bank’s balance sheet total was not permitted to 
exceed ten times its equity, its long-term investments could not exceed 60 of 
equity, and it was not allowed to grant credit to a single borrower in excess of 20 
of its equity (PM, 1987). Financial supervision was already performed by the State 
Banking Supervisory Authority, although not yet independently, as the applicable 
Ministerial Council Decree stated the power to supervise banking activity was 
exercised by the minister of ﬁ nance through the State Banking Supervisory 
Authority. And in 1989, the range of available supervisory tools was also fairly 
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narrow. Th e simplicity of the regulation is illustrated by the fact that all the rules 
on establishment, prudent operation and supervisory procedures ran to only six 
pages of text.
Th is situation was changed slightly by Ministerial Council Decree 106/1989 on the 
Bank Supervision Conditions for Conducting Banking Activity and on the State 
Banking Supervisory Authority. Th is also introduced a regulatory tool whereby 
the supervisory authority could impose supervisory ﬁ nes on a bank or its senior 
executives. Th e decree was also innovative in that it replaced the existing, 
leverage-based regulation with an adjusted balance sheet total calculation that 
applied certain basic risk weights (e.g. receivables from the central bank and the 
state received a multiplier of zero, and those from other banks a 0.2 multiplier). 
Th e 1989 MC decree also introduced the concept of doubtful receivables (e.g. 
exposures to loss-making debtors or receivables more than 60 days in arrears), 
the book value of which had to be reduced by 10 percent a year. Another new 
concept appearing in the decree was the supervisory fee payable by banks, which 
at that time was set at one tenth of a percent of annual interest and commission 
income (MC, 1989) 
It should be borne in mind that all this took place in the period before the regime 
change and the widespread adoption of the internet, when it was nothing like as 
easy as it is now for the experts draft ing the regulations to obtain suitable examples 
of international best practices. A positive aspect of the domestic regulation that 
deserves a mention is that the most important rules already reﬂ ected eﬀ orts to 
follow the example of more advanced Western European countries, although they 
were adopted into domestic practice in signiﬁ cantly simpliﬁ ed form. Th is is why 
the evolution of bank regulation in Hungary cannot be studied in isolation from 
the changes taking place at global level.
2 KEY FACTORS SHAPING THE EVOLUTION OF BANK REGULATION
IN HUNGARY
Th e past 30 years of development of domestic bank regulation have been dominated 
by gradual convergence with the European regulatory environment. Adopting 
the laws of the European community was not yet compulsory in the 1990s, but 
the rules set out in the various directives had an increasingly strong inﬂ uence on 
Hungarian standards. Th e Financial Institutions Act passed in 1991 already set 
out to adopt the international system of norms, and in this context it also included 
two regulatory items that would have a major impact on the Hungarian banking 
system. Th e ﬁ rst was the stipulation of a minimum eight-percent solvency ratio, 
with the details of how this was calculated to be determined by a regulation of 
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the banking supervisory authority.1  Th is framework, which was more or less in 
harmony with the EEC directive of the time, was what deﬁ ned the minimum 
solvency requirements in Hungary.
Solvency ratio versus Liquidity ratio 
Th e Hungarian name of the solvency ratio introduced in the EEC was fairly 
arbitrary. In 1991 it featured in the Pit. under the subheading of solvency, 
but was named the risk weighted asset ratio. Th e same indicator appears in 
1996 in the newly draft ed credit institutions act as the solvency ratio, but 
this name was changed liquidity ratio in the same statutory provision from 
2003, to bring it into line with the oﬃ  cial Hungarian translation of the EU 
directive on which it was based. Th e use of the term liquidity ratio, however, 
was misleading as the ratio does not indicate the credit institution’s ability to 
meet short-term obligations (its liquidity), but its capital adequacy (solvency). 
From 1 July 2007, however, the logic of the Credit Institutions Act changed, 
and instead of setting an eight-percent liquidity ratio as the minimum 
requirement, it stated that a credit institution must always meet the capital 
requirement prescribed in separate rules for the various risk exposures, as 
well as the additional capital requirement stipulated for it by the supervisory 
authority. Th is logic remained aft er the CRR took eﬀ ect, so today the laws no 
longer oﬃ  cially prescribe obligation to calculate the solvency ratio – although 
the National Bank of Hungary and analysts continue to require this – but 
states that the regulatory capital at a credit institution’s disposal must always 
exceed the sum total of its capital requirements.
Th e other change to the Financial Institutions Act that had a major impact was the 
introduction of the requirement to set aside provisions for classiﬁ ed receivables. 
Th e rating of receivables and determination of the provisions was also regulated 
by a supervisory authority regulation.2 Although there was a protracted debate 
about whether the provisions generated in this way could be recognised by banks 
as items reducing the tax base, it was the imposition of these two requirements 
that eventually helped to uncover the problems that had been mounting up at 
Hungarian banks since the early 1990s. Until that time, the banks had not been 
incentivised or forced to set aside provisions for their non-performing exposures, 
moreover the lack of regulations on non-accrued interest allowed them to state 
1  Banking Supervisory Authority regulation 1/1992 (PK. 5.) on the Basic Principles and Rules for 
the Calculation of Capital Adequacy
2  State Bank Supervisory Authority regulation 3/1992 (PK. 10.) on the Criteria for Rating 
Receivables   
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substantially higher proﬁ ts than they had actually realised. All the general public 
saw of the banks’ operation was that they were building ever bigger and more 
opulent new oﬃ  ces, and paying sky-high salaries to their executives. Th is is why 
an article published in the Financial Times in May 1993, calling two large banks 
in Hungary technically insolvent, came like a bolt out of the blue as far as public 
opinion was concerned. Th e exposure of the actual situation highlighted that fact 
that considerable problems had accumulated at Hungarian banks, which could 
only be resolved with bank, debtor and credit consolidation measures.
Lack of rules on non-accrued interest
Numerous problems had to be addressed during the switch to a two-tier bank-
ing system in Hungary. Especially prominent among these was the shortage 
of managers and employees with the requisite experience and expertise, as 
well as the weakness of the regulatory framework. For a long time there were 
no appropriate rules on capital requirements and provisioning, so the banks’ 
ﬁ nancial statements did not reﬂ ect the actual situation. Th e most important 
of the missing rules was the requirement to state non-accrued interest, and in 
the absence of this obligation the banks stated revenues that had not actually 
been received. A bank with a non-performing debtor would recognise the 
interest payable on their loan as income, but was not under an obligation to 
set aside adequate provisions for this. Furthermore, under the accounting 
rules, all amounts received as loan repayments received from borrowers had 
to be recognised as interest payments ﬁ rst, with only the remainder stated 
as a principal repayment. Consequently, the banks were able to continue 
reporting high pre-tax proﬁ ts with no basis in fact. Th e ﬁ ctive proﬁ ts generated 
in this way were taxed, paid out as dividend or added to capital in the form of 
retained earnings. As the ﬁ rst solution to the problem of non-accrued inte-
rest, from the end of 1993 a regulation of the Banking Supervisory Authority 
stipulated that provisions of 100 had to be set aside for interest receivables 
that have not yet been received; then, from 1996 the requirement to state non-
accrued interest was adopted in the accounting regulations. Th e seriousness 
of the problem is illustrated by the fact that the provisions set aside for inte-
rest revenues by banks at the end of 1993 accounted for around a ﬁ ft h of all 
provisions generated by the banks (BAF, 1993).
Apart from the establishment and constant updating of the regulations, the early 
1990s were also characterised by a rapid increase in the number of banks (in 1993 
alone, six new banks were formed (BAF, 1993)), and competition between the 
banks also got under way – albeit only half-heartedly at ﬁ rst – in the retail bank-
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ing sector. And it was not only the external regulatory environment that needed 
development. During this period, supervisory on-site examinations revealed that 
the banks’ internal regulations were also inadequate, so special rules had to be 
made to force an improvement in the standards of internal regulation. From 1994 
the requirements relating to the owners and executives of banks were tightened 
up considerably. It became mandatory to establish an internal auditing unit, and 
the possibility of increasing capital by means of a non-cash contribution was 
ruled out (BAF, 1994/95).
Th e universal banking system
A recurring question in the 1990s was whether or not banks should be able 
to engage in the direct provision of investment services. Th e most important 
reason for separating banking and investment activity was the Glass–Steagall 
Act applied in the United States from 1933. During the investigation into the 
causes of the Great Depression of 1929–33, the US regulators concluded that 
the crisis had been considerably worsened by the fact that the banks were also 
permitted to provide investment services. Th e question was ﬁ rst raised at the 
time of the reestablishment of the Budapest Stock Exchange in 1990. Banks 
were allowed at that time to provide services related to securities trading, but 
this right was abolished in 1993, and the banks only regained it in 1997. Th e 
ﬁ rst variant of the Financial Institutions Act still deﬁ ned investment banks 
as a special type of bank, but these never became widespread in Hungary, and 
were later removed from the law (Pit., 1991). Even during this period, however, 
this activity did not have to completely segregated, as the larger banks could 
have subsidiaries that performed investment service activities. Th erefore, 
although we can identify a period when the domestic banking system was 
not universal, this segregation was never as strict as it was in the USA, where 
the Glass–Steagal Act also prohibited banks from owning investment service 
providers.
From the mid-1990s onwards, the domestic legislative process was increasingly 
dominated by eﬀ orts to achieve full legal harmonisation with a view of joining the 
European Community. Th e need also emerged for a system of supervisory tools 
that were not only capable of reactively resolving existing issues with banks, but 
also provided the opportunity for preventive measures to stop the problems from 
arising in the ﬁ rst place. Accordingly, from 1994 the Pit. gave the supervisory 
authority greater freedom to determine when it could take emergency action, 
and the range of measures that it could implement was also expanded.  Th e 
opportunity to appoint a manager was introduced, and it was from this that the 
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role of supervisory commissioner, which remains in use to this day, evolved. Th is 
period, too, brought market innovations and a broadening of the scope of banks’ 
activities. Accordingly, the strengthening of banks’ oﬀ -balance-sheet activities 
made it necessary to determine the capital requirements for forward transactions 
more precisely. Th e banking supervisory authority regulation on the annual 
percentage rate was issued in the interest of tightening the consumer protection 
rules, and signiﬁ cantly improved the provision of information to customers prior 
to contract signing (BAF, 1995/96). By the second half of the 1990s it had become 
customary for banks to try and reduce their reported risks by selling loans and 
assets from their portfolio with deferred payment and a buyback obligation. For 
this reason, strict provisioning requirements had to be introduced for these items 
(ÁPTF, 1996). 
From 1997, with the passing of the Credit Institutions Act3 (Hpt.), further steps 
were taken towards legal harmonisation with the EU, which made it necessary to 
introduce numerous new deﬁ nitions (e.g. ﬁ nancial service provision instead of 
ﬁ nancial-institution activity, credit institutions instead of ﬁ nancial institutions, 
limits on large exposures instead of large loans). Another event associated with 
the Hpt. was the separation of the incorporation permit and operating license 
for credit institutions, resulting in a two-step authorisation process. Th e Hpt. 
also replaced the previous notiﬁ cation requirement with an obligation to obtain 
supervisory authority approval for the appointment of senior executives at a 
credit institution. Under the Hpt., the banks regained the entitlement to provide 
investment services, and thus the Hungarian banking system became universal 
again (ÁPTF, 1997). Concurrently with this, the banking supervisory authority 
and the securities supervisory authority were merged. Home saving funds and 
mortgage credit institutions were brought under the regulations as new types of 
credit institution.
Th e year 2000 saw another merger of supervisory authorities, as the bank and 
capital markets supervisory authority was augmented with the insurance and 
pension fund supervisory authority. Th is integration of the supervisory bodies 
made it possible for the regulatory processes of ﬁ nancial institutions with similar 
ﬁ nancial risks to converge. At the same time, particular attention was also devoted 
to elaborating the detailed rules of consolidated supervision. Th is approach, 
which was close to international practice, treated group-level compliance as being 
at least as important as compliance at individual company level.
From 2001 a new tool was introduced in the form of supervisory recommendations, 
which were later augmented with methodological guidelines, bulletins 
and executive memorandums. Th ese new tools were not only suitable for 
3  Act CXII of 1996 on Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises
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communicating the domestic supervisory expectations, but also as a vehicle for 
adopting the guidelines of the organisation created to oversee the harmonisation 
of EU bank supervision (CEBS, later the EBA4). Th e early 2000s was essentially 
given over to the preparations for joining the European Union and, within this 
framework, the eﬀ orts to achieve full legal harmonisation.
Bank regulation in Hungary in the ﬁ rst decade of the 2000s was mainly notable 
for the absence of regulatory tools that could have prevented the rapid growth 
in retail foreign currency loans experienced between 2003 and 2008. As a 
consequence of this, the banks not only passed on the exchange rate risk to their 
customers, but were in such a dominant position that they were able to unilaterally 
change the interest rates and various other charges (Balog–Nagy, 2013). Th is 
situation, which appeared very favourable for the banks, backﬁ red on them 
spectacularly as a result of the changes resulting from the global ﬁ nancial crisis, 
leading to a rapid increase in the proportion of non-performing loans. From a 
regulatory perspective, the ﬁ rst half of the 2010s were chieﬂ y devoted to reducing 
the banks’ economic and legal dominant position – providing consumers with 
signiﬁ cantly stronger rights than before – and to making the banking sector 
share some of the losses that it had originally tried to avoid by passing them on to 
consumers. Besides this, it was also necessary to make rules that would prevent 
similar problems reoccurring in future. Th ese regulatory measures included 
the exchange rate cap, the prohibition on unilateral contract amendments that 
are disadvantageous to the customer, the permitting of early repayment in full, 
introduction of debt brake limits (loan-to-income and loan-to-value ratios), as 
well as a considerable tightening of the conditions for retail foreign currency 
lending. Th e fallout from retail foreign currency loans had a long-lasting and 
severe impact on the Hungarian banking sector. Th e only positive outcome of this 
was that it clearly shed light on the problematic fact that, previously, consumer 
protection regulations had been exceptionally weak in Hungary. It became clear 
that consumer protection also had to be bolstered in order to prevent risks buil-
ding up again in the future. As a result of this, the present banking consumer 
protection rules are considerably more robust than they would be had the foreign 
currency lending crisis not occurred.
From 2013, the Hpt. was reworked, retaining its original name but with sweeping 
changes to its content. Th e amendments were primarily needed because of the 
Basel III guidelines and the new EU directives on their implementation; and 
they also created harmony with the CRR rules applicable from 1 January 2014. 
Consequently, a substantial proportion of the prudential regulations were taken 
out of the Hpt. as they were now contained in the EU regulations.
4 CEBS – Committee of European Banking Supervisors; EBA – European Banking Authority
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3 OPPORTUNITIES FOR BANK REGULATION AT NATIONAL LEVEL
Since 2014 the EU has steadily moved towards the regulation of prudential issues 
by means of directly applicable regulations, allowing the member states have 
relatively few opportunities to make rules at national level. Th e most important 
aspects of prudential regulation, therefore, are already a part of the EU legislation. 
In practice, however, several member states – including Hungary – continue to 
apply numerous rules made at national level. In Hungary these are take the form 
of the options and national discretions featured in the CRD/CRR/BRRD5 and in 
the macro-prudential rules, and the laws relating to issues that are not regulated 
at EU level.
Th e EU directives and regulations allow member states to depart from the 
general rules on a number of points. A substantial proportion of these national 
‘discretions’ were related to the introduction of the CRR, and consisted of 
transitional arrangements that member states could use to alter the length of time 
given to banks to fulﬁ l the higher-level requirements of the CRR. Th ese particular 
transitional arrangements were only in eﬀ ect in Hungary for two years, from 2014 
to 2015; and today most of the transitional arrangements in the CRR have expired. 
However, the CRR still provides for decisions that can be made at national level6, 
especially those relating to the minimum initial capital, exemptions from large 
exposure limits, certain detailed rules on the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), 
the risk weighting of exposures secured with real estate, and the treatment of 
investments in insurance companies for the purpose of calculating regulatory 
capital. In Hungary, the most important of these are the opportunity for the Cre-
dit Institutions Act to specify a lower initial capital requirement for cooperative 
credit institutions, and the permitted exemptions from the large exposure limit.
Retrospective studies have shown that one of the causes of the global ﬁ nancial 
crisis was that bank supervision bodies concentrated primarily on the situation of 
individual banks. Th is means that risks aﬀ ecting the system as a whole were not 
properly identiﬁ ed and managed. For this reason, aft er the crisis major steps were 
5 CRD (Capital Requirements Directive) – Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions and investment ﬁ rms.
CRR (Capital Requirements Regulation) Regulation No 575/2013/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment 
ﬁ rms.
BRRD (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive) – Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit 
institutions and investment ﬁ rms.
6  On its website, the EBA gives a detailed description of the options and national discretions applied 
by the member states: https://eba.europa.eu/supervisory-convergence/supervisory-disclosure/
options-and-national-discretions.
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taken at global, EU and domestic level in relation to macro-prudential regulation 
and supervision. Macro-prudential regulation is especially important in the EU, 
because it creates the opportunity to identify the risks that are typical of a given 
country’s ﬁ nancial system, and for the macro-prudential authorities to create – at 
national level – the appropriate rules and requirements to deal with them. One of 
the key areas for macro-prudential regulation is determining the various capital 
buﬀ ers, where the combined buﬀ er requirement has to be calculated taking into 
account the anti-cyclical and global capital buﬀ ers, the capital buﬀ ers relating 
to other systemically important credit institutions and systemic risks, together 
with the capital conservation buﬀ er. In Hungary, the role of the macro-prudential 
supervisory authority is fulﬁ lled by the Central Bank of Hungary, and in this 
capacity it has already determined the buﬀ er requirements relating to other 
systemically important credit institutions, and successfully applied the systemic 
risk buﬀ er to ensure the quickest possible reduction in substandard project loans.
Macro-prudential regulation and supervision, however, goes far beyond the 
setting of capital buﬀ ers, and can extend to any systemic risk with the potential 
to endanger ﬁ nancial stability. Th e Central Bank of Hungary has made use of 
its authority in this area to create numerous macro-prudential rules aimed at 
preventing any future build-up of material systemic risks. Th ese include the ‘debt 
brake’ rules serving to prevent excessive credit growth, as well as the tools for 
managing liquidity and ﬁ nancing risks, namely the foreign exchange funding 
adequacy  ratio (FFAR), foreign exchange coverage ratio (FECR), Mortgage 
Financing Adequacy Ratio (MFAR) or interbank ﬁ nancing ratio (IFR). Th e 
importance of macro-prudential regulation stems not only from its proven ability 
to prevent the built-up of future system risks, but also from that fact that it allows 
rules to be made at national level in cases where the CRR oﬀ ers increasingly few 
opportunities to do so.
Th e currently eﬀ ective Hpt. contains a few more special rules, relating to the 
regulation of banks, which have not been separately determined at EU level. Th e 
1991 Financial Institutions Act already imposed a general reserve requirement, 
and from 1997 the only change was to specify that each credit institution must 
place 10 of its aft er-tax proﬁ t in the general reserve (unless the Central Bank of 
Hungary grants an exemption based on the strength of its high capital adequacy). 
Th ere is also a long tradition of capping a credit institution’s total direct and 
indirect investments at 100 percent of regulatory capital7, which is also not an 
EU requirement but was already stipulated in the 1991 Pit.. Another rule peculiar 
to Hungary is the limit on a credit institution’s investments in real estate. Th e 
ceiling for this was still set at 15 of regulatory capital in the Pit., and 5 in the 
7  Th e upper limit for total investments rose to 125 with eﬀ ect from 1 January 2019.
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present legislation. An interesting contradiction between the Hungarian and EU 
regulation is that the Credit Institutions Act prohibits a credit institution from 
taking on risk in transactions with the purpose of ﬁ nancing the acquisition of 
shares in the bank. Th e CRR does not restrict this; but on the other hand it does 
not permit the credit institution to recognise such equity interests as a part of its 
own funds if their acquisition was ﬁ nanced by the bank itself.  
Th e above examples are additional evidence that even with EU membership 
and against the backdrop of the EU’s increasingly centralised system of bank 
regulation, there is still a need, and opportunities, for national regulatory bodies 
to actively make use of the opportunities available to them, and align the rules on 
banks with the characteristics of the domestic market and risks.
4 THE PRESENT-DAY CHALLENGES OF BANK REGULATION
Th e regulation of banking today is constantly evolving increasingly complex. 
Th is can make life more diﬃ  cult both for the banks and for the supervisory 
authorities, who need to perform their tasks as eﬀ ectively as possible in a rapidly 
changing environment. Th e regulatory responses to the global ﬁ nancial crisis are 
still a work in progress, with the elaboration of many details still currently in 
the pipeline. Th e biggest domestic regulatory challenge of the near future will 
be the local implementation of the amendments currently being made to the 
CRD and BRRD. Th ese will substantially alter the system for determining the 
supervisory additional capital requirement, and will also introduce supervisory 
capital guidance as a new regulatory tool. In the case of the latter, the supervisory 
authority, taking the results of the stress tests into consideration among other 
factors, determines for every bank the additional capital that it expects to be made 
available in addition to the Pillar 2 capital requirement. Th e MREL (Minimum 
Requirement for Eligible Liabilities) regulations will also be ﬁ nalised in the CRR 
and BRRD, based on which the Central Bank of Hungary, as the recovery and 
resolution authority, determines the extent of eligible liability a bank needs to 
have in addition to the capital requirements, in order to cover the losses in the 
event of a crisis management procedure. In addition, the capital requirements 
applied to date will be supplemented with a new, additional requirement relating 
to the leverage ratio.
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Leverage ratio: the higher the better!
By its original deﬁ nition, the leverage ratio measures the proportion of a 
business’s total assets/activity to its equity. Accordingly, in the traditional 
approach, the higher leverage a company has, the riskier it is, because its 
activities are ﬁ nanced with a high proportion of external funds that carry a 
repayment obligation. Banks traditionally operate with high leverage, and the 
global ﬁ nancial crisis demonstrated that regardless of whether a bank had a 
satisfactory capital adequacy ratio, it was primarily the institutions operating 
with high leverage that got into trouble. However, the new guidelines drawn 
up by the Basel Committee, which will soon take eﬀ ect in the EU in the form 
of a regulation, deﬁ ne the leverage ratio not as total assets/equity, but as the 
ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk exposures adjusted for correction factors, and 
stipulates that it must always be at least 3. So while under the traditional 
approach the higher the leverage the riskier the bank, with the new ratio, a 
higher ﬁ gure indicates safer bank operation.
Th e current proposed regulatory amendments to the CRD and CRR do not yet 
incorporate the changes made by the Basel Committee at the end of 2017 with 
the aim of ﬁ nalising the Basel III framework. Th ese will be included in a later EU 
legislation process, and are expected to take eﬀ ect from 2022. Th e output ﬂ oor to 
be introduced for banks that use the internal model approach for calculating the 
capital requirement of credit risk, the increase in the sensitivity of the standard 
approach for credit risk, the narrowing of the range of applications of internal 
models and the reworking of the capital requirement calculation for operational 
risk, will all improve the stability of the domestic banking system.
Th e European Union has also started to draw up stand-alone regulations in two 
other areas that will have a substantial impact on the Hungarian banking sector. 
Perhaps the most important of these is the new system of rules to be elaborated 
in respect of non-performing loans, with the aim of preventing non-performing 
exposures from accumulating at banks again. To this end, a new set of rules 
will have to established, which requires banks to recognise impairment at an 
increasingly high rate aft er the exposure becomes non-performing, to cover the 
expected losses. Another part of the NPL package is incentives to develop the NPL 
secondary market, facilitating better recovery of the receivables, and providing 
member states with technical guidance on the establishment of national asset ma-
nagement companies.
Th e other signiﬁ cant regulatory amendment taking shape at the present time is 
aimed at placing emphasis on sustainable ﬁ nance. Th e EU intends to use bank 
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regulation as one of the means of encouraging investments in the European 
Union that are in line with the environmental objectives, and reduce the burden 
on the environment. To achieve this, numerous amendments are expected, in 
particular the categorisation of investments in terms of the extent to which they 
serve environmental interests, while prudential regulations will permit the use 
of a more favourable risk weight for the ﬁ nancing of investments of this nature. 
Systemically important banks, meanwhile, will have to disclose additional 
information about the extent of their exposure to the elevated risks resulting from 
climate change, and how they are managing them.  
Although they are not discussed in detail here, we should also mention the steps 
taken and planned in the interest of achieving capital markets union in the EU 
(secured bonds, SME ﬁ nance, ESN), which will also have an indirect eﬀ ect on the 
operating environment of banks in Hungary.
5 SUMMARY
Bank regulation in Hungary has undergone massive changes over the past 30 
years. It has taken several crises, and the lessons learned from these, for today’s 
far-reaching system of rules governing even the smallest details of bank operation 
and risks to emerge. Alongside the comprehensive rules of the European Union, 
however, there is still a need for rules to be made at national level, taking local 
characteristics into account, which may be able to prevent a future build-up of 
excessive risks. Th e responses of international regulators to the global ﬁ nancial 
crisis are still a work in progress. Given the rapid pace of innovation and evolution 
of banking operations, they will probably continue to have a role in ensuring that 
regulation and supervision, combined, are capable of preventing excessive losses 
in the future. Exposure to risk, and the attendant potential losses, is a natural 
feature of banking activity; and as such it should not be avoided, but maintained 
within the appropriate framework. For this reason, regulators constantly need to 
maintain a healthy balance between avoiding unnecessary over-regulation and 
unwarranted increases in the costs of regulation, and establishing frameworks 
for reducing the probability of events that threaten ﬁ nancial stability to a mini-
mum. Until now, in most cases, each of the main milestones in the development 
of bank regulation was closely associated with a speciﬁ c crisis event that required 
immediate regulatory intervention (e.g. Herstatt Bank, BCCI, Barings, retail 
foreign currency lending). Experience tells us that the periodic occurrence of 
crises is unavoidable, so it is in the best interests of every actor in the ﬁ nancial 
markets for the next crisis to ﬁ nd a Hungarian banking sector that is prepared, 
solvent and capable of weathering stress situations.
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